Intrusion and hold-up alarm systems (I&HAS) are an established part of the protective security measures commonly deployed at most commercial, and many domestic, premises against the possibility of theft, robbery, malicious damage and arson. For simplicity the term I&HAS is used throughout this document, although it is possible for an intruder alarm system (IAS) or hold-up alarm system (HAS) to exist independently of each other, as well as in combination.

These guidelines have been produced to assist specifiers and potential users in understanding certain factors that need to be considered before installing a security fog device.

This guide is an updated version of that originally issued in 2007. The main revisions reflecting the issue of the 2008 version of BS 7984: Keyholding and response services. Code of practice, plus police requirements for the introduction of ‘intervention’ with certain hold up (personal attack) alarm activations.

This document considers the issues for insurers that are emerging with the introduction of this technology, and proposes a basis for evaluating the various implementations of the technology. Specifically, the purpose of this guide is to help the insurance industry assess whether IP-based alarm transmission systems (ATSs) which are currently being promoted to the security industry are fit for the purpose of forming the signalling link from an intrusion and hold-up alarm system (I&HAS) to an alarm receiving centre (ARC).

This document provides guidance on the subject of electronic security systems for empty buildings to assist those considering installing such systems. It supplements the Insurers’ Property Crime Research (IPCRes) group publication, The protection of empty buildings, which provides comprehensive information regarding the problems often associated with empty buildings, together with guidance concerning possible safeguards. In order to set the scene for what follows, this current document briefly restates some of the principles outlined at greater length in The protection of empty buildings.

In a gas attack on an ATM, a compressed gas, usually bottled Oxyacetylene, is injected into the ATM and ignited. The number of gas attacks has grown every year with petrol stations, supermarkets and bank branches suffering the largest share of attacks.

Vacant buildings are often more susceptible to the risk of fire (arson), criminal activity, misuse and malicious damage. This guide looks at what preparations, practical measures and security controls can be applied to help manage the risk.

This document signposts sources of good practice for counter terrorism measures including guidance documents and websites, sources of advice and National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) sector guides.

The scope of this document is limited to the security of 'stand-alone' and 'freestanding' automated teller machines (ATM's) typically located in convenience stores, petrol stations, supermarkets, pubs and clubs.

This guide examines the principal components, design, operation, benefits and limitations of automatic electronic access control systems. Reference is also made to other methods for controlling access but they are mentioned only in passing. Although the guide should assist security practitioners wishing to add to their knowledge of the technology, it should also be comprehensible to the non-technical reader eg the potential EACS purchaser.